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Objectives: To determine accidental factors, clinical presentation and medical care in cases of seafarers presenting
phosphine poisoning symptoms on board a bulk carrier.
To consider primary prevention of this pathology, which can have extremely severe consequences.
Methods: To analyse circumstances resulting in toxic exposure to phosphine in the sea transport sector.
To obtain information from medical reports regarding the seafarer’s rescue.
To identify the causes of this accidental poisoning and how to establish an early, appropriate diagnosis thus
avoiding other cases.
Results: In February 2008, on board a bulk carrier with a cargo of peas, a 56-year-old seafarer with intense abdominal
and chest pains, associated with dizziness, was rescued by helicopter 80 miles away from the coast. Despite being
admitted rapidly to hospital, his heart rate decreased associated with respiratory distress. He lost consciousness
and convulsed. He finally died of pulmonary oedema, major metabolic acidosis and acute multi organ failure.
The following day, the captain issued a rescue call from the same vessel for a 41-year-old man also with abdominal
pain, vomiting and dizziness. The ECG only revealed type 1 Brugada syndrome.
Then 11 other seafarers were evacuated for observation. 3 showed clinical abnormalities.
Collective poisoning was suspected.
Medical team found out that aluminium phosphide pellets had been put in the ship’s hold for pest control before
the vessel’s departure. Seafarers were poisoned by phosphine gas spreading through cabins above the hold. It was
found that the compartments and ducts were not airtight.
Conclusion: Unfortunately, a seafarer on board a bulk carrier died in 2008 because of acute phosphine poisoning.
Fumigation performed using this gas needs to be done with extreme care. Systematic checks need to be carried
out before sailing to ensure that the vessel’s compartments are airtight.
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The chances of surviving after being poisoned on board
are much less favourable than on shore [1]. This differ-
ence in prognosis can be explained by several factors.
Other than the obvious transport difficulties and medical
assistance which can be a long way from the coast, it is
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unless otherwise stated.which makes both preventive and therapeutic treatment
difficult.
We are going to describe the problem areas respon-
sible for the cases observed on board a bulk carrier navi-
gating off the coast of Finistère in France, in February
2008. On this date, the captain called emergency rescue
services for one of his crew members who was suffering
from abdominal pain and difficulties breathing. He was
evacuated by helicopter but died shortly after. Several
hours later, another emergency call was made for a simi-
lar clinical case to the previous one. This seafarer was
also evacuated by helicopter. The vessel was rerouted toThis is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public Domain
g/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article,
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were taken to hospital for observation. Facing multiple
cases like this, collective poisoning was investigated and
the chemical agent suspected and later identified was
phosphine.
In order to determine accidental factors and to consider
primary prevention of this poisoning which occurred on
board, we have analysed circumstances resulting in toxic
exposure to phosphine in the sea transport sector.
Discussions about this case have lead to comparisons
being made with other cases in different circumstances.
Nevertheless, we focused on unintentional poisoning [2,3]
even if voluntary ingestion is frequently reported [4,5].
Case report
History and medical care
On 7th February, 2008 at 18:11, a Romanian bulk carrier
(Figure 1) navigating 80 km north of the island of Ouessant,
sailing from Rouen in France to Cairo in Egypt, with a
load of approximately eighty-thousand tonnes of peas,
contacted the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre
(MRCC) Corsen to evacuate of one of its crew members
for medical reasons (patient n° 1). This 56-year old man,
discretely over weighted, onboard electrician, had received
orders from the captain to rest in his cabin since the pre-
vious evening as he had been suffering from increasingly
severe digestive disorders in the form of acute abdominal
pain accompanied with dizziness. His was given emer-
gency medical care and was taken by helicopter to Brest
Hospital, France. No information was given by the officers
on the vessel as to possible poisoning. No other seafarer
was reported ill in the first report.
The first medical examination found the patient con-
scious and oriented. The Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS)
score was 15 at this time. He complained of abdominal
and chest pain similar to symptoms of an acute coronary
syndrome associated with high blood pressure andFigure 1 Bulk carrier where the poisoning occurred.reduction of the diastolic-systolic time interval. It was
not clear from the ECG done in the helicopter whether
there was myocardial infarction or not. In the Accident
and Emergency waiting room, the patient’s respiratory
condition with cyanosis deteriorated. Suddenly, he
convulsed, showed signs of unconsciousness which de-
teriorated rapidly justifying sedation and intubation.
An emergency chest x-ray showed an oedema spreading
throughout the two lungs and the heart. An electro-
mechanical dissociation was found. Closer inspection of
the ECG readings excluded myocardial infarction. The pa-
tient went rapidly into shock: his pulse and blood pressure
were impossible to take, despite volume expansion and
administration of adrenaline, dobutamine and atropine.
Biological results were the following: CBC normal, PT at
61% with no other coagulation abnormality, lactic acidosis
(anionic hole 39, lactates 25.5 mmol/L) decompensated by
an alkaline reserve down to 7 mmol/L), and hypergly-
caemia 4.6 g/L, CPK and troponine were both normal.
No abnormalities were found in the hepatic or pancre-
atic results either.
The seafarer died at 21:35 as a result of these major
acid-base abnormalities. Metabolic acidosis was suspected
to have been caused by an external factor with no further
details. The MRCC was informed of the death.
The following morning at 7 :23, the cargo ship (having
continued its route to Egypt), and at that time 60 kms
from the coast, made another call to the authorities to
evacuate a second seafarer (patient n° 2), 41 years old,
who was also had symptoms of dizziness with repeated
vomiting and abdominal pain. The MRCC requested
medical evacuation by helicopter. Collective poisoning
was by then suspected.
The medical team found the man to be conscious and
oriented. GCS score was 15 at this time, 96% saturation
in ambient air. He was complaining of abdominal pain,
vomiting and dizziness when standing up and his condi-
tion had been deteriorating since the previous evening.
Symptoms improved considerably when the seafarer left
his bunk. His medical history was the following: active
smoker, appendectomy, frequent abdominal pain.
At the same time, the Marine Prefecture services re-
quested the cargo ship to head for the coast for inspec-
tion. A further conversation with the ship’s captain
concerning the chemical products on board lead the au-
thorities to suspect collective phosphine poisoning:
phosphine had been used as an insecticide on board the
vessel in the holds containing peas. Clinical examination
of the second patient was normal and the biological re-
sults were completely normal. Moreover, there was no
acid-basic imbalance or any other gasometric abnormal-
ity, or higher cardiac enzyme or hepatic readings. The
ECG showed a rise in the ST segment in V1 V2 associ-
ated with a right bundle branch block, characteristic of a
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and had no history of sudden death in the family. The
seafarer, at that time, with no symptoms, was admitted
to hospital, into cardiac intensive care for monitoring
for a documented risk of total atrioventricular block or
heart rhythm disorders such as ventricular tachycardia.
Three days later, he left hospital with stable ECG read-
ings. Onboard the ship, while waiting for the chemical
diagnosis, the seafarers were kept out of danger on deck.
As there was no risk of explosion as initially suggested,
the ship was authorized to go into the bay of Brest and
berth in the port. The eleven other crew members were
taken to hospital for medical examination.
Amongst these eleven seafarers aged between 34 and
59 years old, nine said nothing was wrong, one com-
plained of weakness and the other complained of chest
pain which improved when taken away from the con-
taminated area. As well as a standard clinical examination,
each patient had a biological examination, chest x-ray and
ECG. Specific clinical information being looked for in
these consultations and examinations were the follow-
ing: any medical history, presence or not of neurological
signs (headaches, dizziness and abnormalities in the
neurological examination); digestive signs (pain, nausea,
diarrhoea…); difficulties breathing and chest pain. The
biological examination included renal, hepatic, tropo-
nine, lactatemia and plasma ionogram testing.
The patient complaining of weakness (patient n°3,
46 years old) was the one who confirmed the death of
his colleague. At that time, he was wearing a protection
mask. Clinical examination in Accident and Emergency
was completely normal. Oxygen saturation was 95% in
ambient air with spontaneous breathing even though a
smoker. Para-clinical examination was also normal. He
was kept under observation for twenty-four hours.
The patient complaining of occasional chest pain on
board the vessel (patient n° 4, 38 years old) improved
considerably in Accident and Emergency. Symptoms in-
cluding retrosternal chest pain had lasted for several mi-
nutes the previous day. Clinical examination was normal
and the ECG showed a banal right bundle branch block.
He was kept in for observation for twenty-four hours.
Another patient (patient n°5, 55 years old and ship’s
cook), had no symptoms, but showed some abnormal-
ities when examined. Chest examination found crackling
at the base of the lungs and the ECG showed up a right
bundle branch block. His biological results were com-
pletely normal and the chest x-ray didn’t show any signs
of overload. He was kept under observation for twenty-
four hours. At the end of the observation period, the
branch block had disappeared and the chest examination
had become normal. He was advised to consult again
quickly should palpitations, difficulties breathing or
chest pain reoccur in the following few days.For the eight other patients, clinical examinations, bio-
logical results, chest x-rays and ECGs were normal. They
were, however, kept for observation for twenty-four or
forty-eight hours (according to a calculated exposure
risk), except one of them who refused to go to hospital
and for another whose presence on board was deemed
necessary and compatible with his state of health.Medical follow-up
Out of the 11 seafarers on board, 10 are still alive and in
good health 5 years after this tragedy.
An autopsy was carried out on the deceased seafarer
on 13 February 2008, 6 days after his death. A dilated
heart condition was detected, a healthy coronary net-
work, absence of lung tissue abnormalities and pleuro-
pericardial effusion. The liver, spleen, kidneys (other
than an isolated cyst), encephalon and alimentary canal
were normal. Moreover, there was no evidence of
trauma. Blood, stomach, kidney, brain, heart and lung
samples were taken for anatomical, pathological and
toxicological analysis.
From a histological point of view, the tissues analysed
were within the normal range. No traces of medication
or narcotics were found. Phosphorous compounds were
tested using a technique of gas phase analysis associated
with mass spectrometry (detection from 0.1 mg/l). The
Musshoff [6] technique was used for phosphine calibra-
tion. In all tissues, phosphine characterisation was nega-
tive. It was extremely likely that the phosphine had been
eliminated from the samples considering its high volatil-
ity [7] or due to spontaneous ignition [8], bearing in
mind that it was tested for 6 days after death and that it
was absorbed by inhalation and not ingestion. To con-
clude, when exposure and clinical symptoms are well
identified, chemical analysis for phosphine in blood or
urine is not recommended as phosphine is rapidly oxi-
dised into phosphite and hypophosphite [8,9].Toxicology tests
Phosphine is a gas used for the fumigation of grain on
board cargo ships [1]. In this specific case, an external
French company was responsible for fumigating the ves-
sel. This company started procedures by offloading the
product on the quayside in the port of Rouen, before the
vessel’s departure.
Once the grain had been loaded into the cargo holds,
it was then treated with aluminium phosphide pellets
placed on the surface of the piles of grain in each hold:
equivalent of 1 g to 1.5 g of aluminium phosphide per
m3. This large quantity of aluminium phosphide pellets
reacted in contact with the air, water and moisture to
release a phosphine gas thereby killing insects and
larva.
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In other words, the more humid the weather (which is
the case in February in Europe) the faster (and at high
levels of concentration) gas is produced.
Phosphine is an expanding gas which spreads through
the closed environment of holds reaching pesticide con-
centration (several hundred ppm). This concentration
reaches its peak once all the aluminium phosphide pel-
lets have reacted with the air or water in the holds then
it decreases during the voyage, until hardly detectable
after 3 weeks. Nevertheless, great care must be taken
when handling the open pellet blisters after fumigation
in order to control complete dissolution. Protective
equipment must be worn in these cases (Figure 2).
The ship’s captain was informed of this fumigation
and the external French company gave him MSA colori-
metric tubes so that he could test for the presence of
this gas onboard should the gas spread from the hold
through the ship.
In the case we are presenting, phosphine gas was
tested for on 8 February, in other words, the day the sec-
ond seafarer was poisoned. Testing was positive in the
two cabins of the poisoned seafarers. Emergency services
were aware of these positive tests and told the ship’s cap-
tain to evacuate and ventilate the two cabins.
Marine rescue services arrived onboard 4 hours after
the cabins had been ventilated and found 0.24 ppm of
phosphine near the holds and a trace of phosphine in
the ventilated cabins.
Analysis and discussion
The first written review on acute phosphine poisoning
dates from 1958 [10] and the first recorded case dates
from 1900. Numerous deaths have been reported: when
using the chemical product; during the chemicalFigure 2 Operators handling blisters which contained
aluminium phosphide pills.manufacturing process [11]; when it started to be used
(including the maritime sector) [12,13] and in cases of
voluntary poisoning [14-17]. However, to our know-
ledge, these are the only cases on board a bulk carrier.
There are, however, numerous cases on board con-
tainer vessels [12,13].
In fact, aluminium phosphide is used as a rodenticide,
insecticide and fumigant for stored cereals. Agriculture
and transport are therefore professional sectors where
there is potential exposure [18]. Peshin and Coll also
showed a high incidence of poisoning due to household
pesticides compared with agricultural pesticides, clearly
emphasizing the need for educating and generating
awareness about correct usage as well as implementing
prevention programmes [19]. Unfortunately, this ready
access also means that aluminium phosphide has been
listed as a commonly ingested toxin for attempting
suicide [20].
Random exposure is uncommon. It can be due to in-
haling the still-expanding gas in food storage [21] or
when ingesting food already contaminated by this chem-
ical product [22,23]. Veterinarians caring for animals
[24] and health workers caring for people who have
absorbed aluminium phosphide can also come into con-
tact with generated phosphine gas [25].
Until now, case reports as well as anatomical, patho-
logical post-mortem studies have not completely identi-
fied the pathophysiological phenomena involved [26-29],
even if animal experimentation seems to point to mito-
chondrial respiratory chain inhibition due to cytochrome
C oxydase damage in humans. Moreover, inhibition of
other detoxification enzyme systems may also explain
why system damage is so severe [30,31]. It is also likely
that the unclear clinical picture, especially in cases of
low exposure, has contributed to not being able to iden-
tify the true cause of this problem in numerous cases.
In the above case, several factors were responsible for
the seafarers severe poisoning. Firstly, when the vessel
was at berth, aluminium phosphide pellets were put
down by subcontractors and not the ship’s crew. The
seafarers were unaware of insect fumigation: no details
or explanation had been given to them about it. More-
over, only the captain knew what kind of product had
been used while the rest of the crew was unaware of
how poisonous it was.
Information and training on phosphine gas were, there-
fore, insufficient.
Secondly, phosphine gas expansion rapidly reached
pesticide concentration in the holds due to high mois-
ture content in this large, closed area at this time of year
(February is a winter month in Western Europe). As a
result, for 1.500 g used per m3 (common practice), the
concentration of phosphine gas reached 700 ppm inside
the holds as gas concentrations expanded and levelled
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mated that at peak concentration in the holds, approxi-
mately the same concentration of gas would have been
found in the contaminated cabins.
Thirdly, gas had leaked had from the holds to the
cabins. Several months after this incident, the expertise
highlighted the causes of this leak. Moreover, Lloyds©
found two main problems.
The first problem revealed holds which were no longer
airtight due to rusting of certain partitions. The second
related to the smoke detection system between the holds
and the crew quarters (in particular the deceased sea-
farer’s cabin). Initially shut off, the ducts were reo-
pened because the crew wasn’t aware of potential
fumigation in the holds. This then meant that the gas
could expand throughout these closed areas (firstly the
holds, then the cabins). Therefore, the spreading of
phosphine from the holds towards the quarters, lo-
cated on the deck above could be explained by the fact
that the ventilation ducts connecting the two areas of
the vessel were not shut off.
In order to explain why Patient 1 was the first and the
most severely intoxicated, we found that exposure was
higher in his cabin and he stayed in there longer. In fact,
his cabin was found to be the one where ducts were
completely reopened. Moreover, the captain told him to
stay in his cabin when he began to present the first
symptoms. Meanwhile, the other crew members were at
work in different parts of the boat (so not in their
cabins). When Patient 1 closed the door for a rest it
caused the gas to expand in this completely airtight area.
Fourthly, the non-specific symptoms of the first af-
fected seafarer looked like an abdominal surgical emer-
gency. This delayed the diagnosis of acute poisoning and
was only confirmed after the second case. In addition to
all this were problems of communication between the
captain and coastal rescue services.
Fifthly, as the ship was far out at sea, considerable
time elapsed between rescue services receiving the calls
and arriving on the scene. And, unfortunately, despite
rescue services removing the first poisoned seafarer from
the area and giving him medical care, the lesions were
far too advanced to be able to save his life.
Finally, phosphine was only detected after the event,
with information given by the captain about pellets used
to fumigate the holds. Moreover, there is still no antidote
for phosphine despite the fact that protective treatment
is being discussed [26].
This additional case of poisoning raises questions
about the extensive use of phosphine in transport of
grain by sea, combined with often badly maintained
fleets. If, in most cases, there is no choice other than
using smoke insecticides, it must be used by people who
are trained and qualified in risk management.Unfortunately, the Californian study by Melher and
Coll [31] confirms that in over 75% of cases of poisoning,
those affected are the ones who are not trained in fumiga-
tion processes. In this particular case, seafarers responsible
for the ship’s operations had little or no training in risks
related to phosphine.
Maintenance of ships and, in particular, the holds, is of
the upmost importance; as well as training in risks re-
lated to working at sea, including the use of colorimetric
detection kits.
From a medical angle, this case also stands out:
 Patient n° 1 showed digestive symptoms associated
with dizziness followed by chest pain after being
exposed for several hours. These symptoms are
classic. His condition then deteriorated abruptly and
he died of multi-system organ failure with major
metabolic acidosis. It was difficult to determine the
exact causes of death: was it linked to acute heart-
respiratory failure or rather the result of the acid-
base imbalance? Mechanisms of metabolic acidosis
in phosphine poisoning are thought to be the cause
of oxidative stress [26], and considering the severity,
could well be the direct cause of death in this case.
This has already been described, but does not
characterise the most common cause of death which
is ARDS. However, we can assume that metabolic
acidosis was secondary to pulmonary-heart failure,
especially since the acids responsible were of
endogenous origin (lactates). We also noted heart
damage with myocardial dysfunction with electro
mechanic dissociation (direct result of poisoning or
a case of multi organ failure).
 Patient n° 2 showed cardiac transmission disorders.
These are also frequently described, but in atypical
cases with ST segment elevation characteristic of a
type 1 Brugada syndrome, which improved after a
few days. Functional symptoms were similar to
patient n° 1. This symptoms could be compared
with those described in case of weak occupational
exposure in Misra and coll study [32].
 As for the other seafarers, it is hard to estimate or
even to appreciate the reality of this kind of
poisoning. The only abnormality found was a right
bundle branch block which spontaneously
improved after several hours of monitoring, with
no functional troubles.
Conclusion
If the transport of grain by bulk carrier cannot be done
without the use of insecticides, strict security measures
must be enforced. The advantage of phosphine is that
it is relatively simple for trained personnel to use.
However, incidents or accidents due to exposure are
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transported by sea is rising every year. Safety procedures
must be scrupulously respected to ensure the safety of
the seafarers on board, and this will require appropriate
training of personnel. Particular attention must be paid
to: on board ventilation; storage of aluminium phosphide
pellets; airtight holds and access to a simple, reliable way
of detecting this gas on board.
From a medical point of view, the doctor examining
the seafarer with non-specific symptoms as described
above should suspect phosphine poisoning; then, taking
into account any medical history, should actively look
for the possible source of poisoning. On one hand, the
risk to the other crew members should be checked and
they should be kept way from danger. On the other
hand - even if there is no effective antidote - clinical im-
provement of the poisoned patient can be expected and
paraclinical examinations within this context can be
carried out.
As there is no specific treatment and taking into con-
sideration current knowledge on this subject (even if
types of protective treatment are under discussion),
only symptomatic treatment to sustain vital organ
function is possible. When stabilised, the patient
should be observed and the heart monitored. This ob-
servation period should last at least 72 hours. After-
wards, biological monitoring for renal and hepatic
function should be done, especially if the initial results
are abnormal.Consent
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